CARICOM AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE: PROBING THE LIMITS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

BY

JESSICA BYRON

Abstract

Regional integration in the Caribbean has always had an implicit security dimension. It has been driven by small state perceptions of their political and economic vulnerability vis-à-vis the external environment and the need for collective responses. Since 1973, a number of institutions have evolved to provide responses in the form of regular consultations and declaratory diplomacy, harmonized approaches to national security, dispute settlement and conflict management initiatives, often undertaken in collaboration with other multilateral organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS). Nonetheless, from the Grenadian Revolution (1979 – 1983) to the Haitian Crisis of 2006, CARICOM has struggled to reach consensus positions, undertake effective joint action and maintain its credibility in the face of certain regional security issues. This paper will draw on Kirchner’s conceptual framework of security governance to discuss and assess CARICOM’s role in this area of regional cooperation.

Introduction

This paper examines the concept of security governance and discusses its applicability to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). It explores whether CARICOM fits the profile
of a “security provider”, given the very different geopolitical circumstances of the Caribbean region and the capabilities of the organization itself compared with those of the European Union. Specifically, this comparison is made in the context of Emil Kirchner’s suggestion that the EU’s form of security governance may offer a model that can be transferred to other regions (Kirchner, 2006).

The paper begins by discussing the concept of governance in a security context and matching this notion against our understanding of the origins, structure and functions of CARICOM. This is followed by a survey of the various threats that pervade the regional environment and the multi-level response strategies that have been adopted by the states concerned. Finally, we examine CARICOM’s involvement (or lack of it) in seven instances of intra-state or inter-state turbulence between 1983 and the present. This material serves as the background against which we assess CARICOM’s capacity to carry out the various elements of governance in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building.

I. Security Governance

In Kirchner’s conceptual discussion, he shows the similarities and the differences between the idea of a “security community”, proposed initially by Karl Deutsch (1957) and further developed by Constructivist thinkers in the 1990s, and “security governance”. In a security community, during a prolonged period of cooperative interaction, the behaviour and values of the states and societies are modified to the point where there is a
stable environment and “people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30, cited in Kirchner, 2006: 950). Security governance goes beyond the above in suggesting that security is maintained at multiple levels by a variety of state and non-state actors. In the case of the European Union, it goes beyond maintaining stability within the community, it also encompasses the stability of the surrounding external environment. Governance involves the coordination of policies and actions, the management and regulation of issue areas. Security functions, as outlined by Boutros Ghali in 1992 in his report to the United Nations Security Council on the security roles of the United Nations, involve conflict prevention, peace enforcement/peace-keeping and peace building activities.

Kirchner concludes that the EU’s performance in these different areas of activity qualifies it to be considered as a security provider, an institution that generates greater stability in its surroundings. However, despite all the initiatives on coordination, policy-making on security in Europe remains fragmented and challenging to the institutions involved. Nonetheless, the EU’s responsibilities in this area are increasing and the norms and rules it has developed over the years have a significant positive impact on security policy and on the stability of the entire region.

Developments in the European Union have had a tremendous influence on regional integration theorizing and on the shaping and practice of regionalism in other parts of the world. The concepts of security community and security governance can be used to analyze security management in other regions. However, they need to be adapted to the
security and capability conditions prevailing in different locations. In particular, all regional groupings may not be equipped to engage in conflict prevention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement and peace-building on the same scale.

The member states of the European Union, up until the 1980s, were long-established nation-states that viewed security threats as emanating primarily from the overarching bipolar divide. After several decades of regional integration, a security community had taken root and security cooperation had become a process of managing the external environment with a range of non-military measures in addition to the NATO alliance.

In the case of CARICOM, the members are developing states of very recent vintage with limited economic, administrative and security capabilities. In many states, there are low levels of national cohesion and various types of political and social instability. Threat perceptions arising out of these conditions have focused on both the external and the domestic environments. While the external environment has been viewed as the potential source of various types of aggression, a major domestic security preoccupation has been nation-building, the consolidation of a weak state and society.

II. CARICOM’s Origins and Security Environment

CARICOM’s full members are fourteen independent states in or around the Caribbean Sea. One other full member, Montserrat, is a British dependency as are four associate members. Most CARICOM members are islands while Belize is located in Central
America, Guyana and Suriname in South America. The grouping was formed in 1973. Most of the English-speaking countries are founding members while Suriname and Haiti joined in 1995 and 2002 respectively.

CARICOM’s genesis lay in small state perceptions of their vulnerability and limited capacity to cope with a challenging external environment as they assumed sovereignty in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition to concerns about their political and economic viability as states, they had a common sense of Commonwealth Caribbean identity, based on their shared British colonial history and similar institutions. They are located in a complex security environment, influenced by both extra-regional and local factors (Payne and Sutton 1993a).

Significant geopolitical features include proximity to the United States and to a number of large Latin American actors like Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil with strategic interests in the Caribbean Sea or elsewhere on their borders. European powers like Britain, France and the Netherlands have a territorial presence in the region. Caribbean countries are spread out across more than a thousand miles of maritime space and face major challenges of policing their waters and coastal areas. They have diverse threat perceptions and security priorities, based on their different geographical locations, varying types of topographical features, socio-economic and political systems, ideological and alliance choices. While there may be a broad consensus on threats such as domestic crime and violence, drug trafficking or natural disasters, building regional security cooperation in other areas is much more complicated. Even within CARICOM,
the differing priorities of the member states have not always facilitated such cooperation. This was demonstrated in their failure to conclude a regional security agreement in 1991 despite calls for such an initiative after the failed Jamaat-al-Muslimeen coup in Trinidad (Griffith 1992). Existing regional security objectives and structures have been greatly influenced by the perceptions and strategic priorities of their super power neighbour, the United States, working on its own initiative or in collaboration with Caribbean territories to secure its Atlantic/Caribbean border, dubbed the “Third Border”. The United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, which all have overseas territories in the Caribbean, are also integrally involved in cooperation on the maintenance of border security, narcotics and money laundering interdiction. The U.K. in particular is engaged in a range of capacity-building initiatives with CARICOM.

These examples all attest to the complexity of security governance in the Caribbean. Not only are there multiple national jurisdictions involved with differing threat perceptions and priorities, there are also several extra-regional powers with vested interests in the region. In a globalized era, the distinction between domestic and external threats has been blurred and traditional security concerns of maintaining state sovereignty and territorial integrity have expanded considerably to include transnational criminal and terrorist activities and non-traditional threats like the increased incidence of natural disasters and global epidemics. A wide range of non-state actors are therefore included in regional and national security governance, rendering it an even more complex process.

III. Threat Perceptions of CARICOM states
In the 1960s, security challenges facing the future CARICOM states concerned their political and economic viability as states, and more specifically, the issue of territorial integrity. These were exemplified in the Venezuela – Guyana and Guatemala – Belize territorial disputes, the 1967 secession crisis of the multi-island territory of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and finally political unrest in Guyana in 1964 based on ethnic tensions and external subversion. In the 1970s, a sharp increase in Cold War rivalry in the region combined with domestic governance conflicts resulted in ideological, political and social conflict in Jamaica, Guyana and Grenada. Likewise, in a climate of economic downturn, the smaller Eastern Caribbean territories would become vulnerable to threats of mercenary invasion and armed uprisings.

The 1979 events of the Grenada revolution would be followed in 1983 first by a domestic counter-coup and then by military intervention from the United States, Jamaica, Barbados and other OECS member states. In the 1980s the regional security agenda came to reflect the increased US presence and strategic concerns particularly during the first half of the decade. During this time, the Caribbean – Central American region was portrayed as an “arc of crisis” threatened by Soviet-Cuban military and political activities. The US response was a sharp increase in military assistance and training, coupled with the economic and political programmes of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In the latter half of the 1980s, however, this approach was modified and local security perspectives, which emphasized human security concerns, came more to the fore. In the Eastern Caribbean, the Regional Security System, formed in 1982 in response to the Grenadian Revolution
by Barbados and the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, soon de-emphasized excessive militarization, viewing large armed forces on small islands as too costly and an incipient source of threat. It incorporated into its mandate a wide range of non-military threats like natural disasters, marine search and rescue and the policing of fisheries (www.rss.org.bb).

In the 1990s, the central regional security preoccupation, initially of external actors like the United States, and eventually of regional states themselves, became the transnational threat of the narcotics trade. There were various negative by-products for CARICOM societies like a sharp increase in organized crime and violence, a proliferation of illegal weapons, corruption of public officials, growing numbers of deportations from North America and Britain, mostly for drug-related offences, which had the potential to strengthen the ranks of the local criminal gangs.

The 1990s also witnessed a marked tightening of US extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Caribbean region, based on a series of bilateral agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition and Maritime Policing (the latter commonly referred to as the Shiprider Agreements). These were coupled with CARICOM states reinforcing their domestic legislation on money laundering and interdiction of narcotics use or trafficking.

Another major theme of the decade became environmental security as the Caribbean region experienced significant damage and socio-economic disruption from hurricanes, drought, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The lead agencies dealing with ecological
threats are those concerned with disaster preparedness and management and insurance schemes. However, they coordinate activities closely with regional security forces who are trained to respond to such national and regional emergencies.

In addition to perennial environmental security issues, the contemporary threat scenario encompasses territorial and border conflicts which are often complicated by resource or migration issues. There are still ideological and influence conflicts involving Cuba and the United States, Venezuela and the United States and there is a growing incidence of intra-state governance conflicts which have both domestic and transnational dimensions. The most severe case is that of Haiti.

After 2001, the Bush Administration in the United States, in its security partnership with CARICOM states, viewed all the existing cooperation through an anti-terrorism lens. Narcotics interdiction, for example, became anti-narcoterrorism and operations against illegal migration were subsumed into the far more extensive surveillance and interdiction activities of US Homeland Security and the Third Border. CARICOM states share US concerns particularly about the security of the tourist industry and collaborate closely in the areas of port security. They continue to emphasize that their main security threats are the illegal drugs trade for which they are major transshipment points, terrorism, organized crime and its impact on civil society. They have had mixed experiences in their security partnerships with external actors. These partnerships although useful, have focused primarily on the priorities of the external actors. Despite the long history of security consultation and collaboration, they continue to suffer major destabilizing effects of
criminal deportations from North America and Britain which they are ill-equipped to accommodate. Likewise, there has been little significant progress in stemming the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to some CARICOM countries.

IV. Security Governance Structures of CARICOM

CARICOM has evolved as a heavily intergovernmental organization in which unanimous approval by heads of government has been the main approach to decision-making. Although this is preceded by the consultations of lower level ministerial councils and government officials, it has often imposed great constraints on the adoption and implementation of common policies. There was little explicit emphasis in the 1973 founding Treaty of Chaguaramas, in the regional institutions or in periodic policy statements issued at CARICOM Summits on security coordination. CARICOM’s sphere of cooperation was envisaged as economic and social development with some coordination of foreign policy. This, it was hoped, would lead to stable, peaceful societies with acceptable levels of socio-economic wellbeing, and strengthened administrative capabilities. The approach to security management was therefore an indirect one in which security was equated primarily with economic and social stability. But inevitably, political and security issues like the Belizean and Guyanese territorial disputes, the meaning for the Community of a policy of ideological pluralism and the emergence and collapse of the Grenadian Revolution between 1979 and 1983 would have to feature on the agendas of the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers and thence on the agendas
for the Heads of Government Conferences. Security issues were therefore dealt with on an ad hoc basis and coordinated approaches emerged incrementally as responses to crises. CARICOM’s internal governance was generally weak in the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. The Heads of Government Conference, the sole decision-making organ, caught in a maelstrom of economic and political crises, was not convened between 1976 and 1982, although other consultative committees of the regional grouping continued to meet and to elaborate draft policy documents. Notwithstanding their other deep divisions, the governments managed to maintain common regional positions in support of the territorial integrity of Guyana and Belize and to pursue unified diplomatic stances in this regard in their diplomacy in multilateral settings like the United Nations and the Organization of American States. A unified stance was made easier because the issues were relatively clearcut – support for the territorial integrity of newly established countries, member states with a shared British colonial past against third countries. CARICOM countries used the resource most readily available to them, namely coordinated diplomacy in multilateral fora like the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and eventually the Organization of American States to invoke international norms of non-aggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, and to drum up international support for the recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize and Guyana.

Another major security challenge arose between 1979 and 1983 in the form of the Grenadian revolution and its demise. As this watershed event will be discussed further later on, suffice it to say that CARICOM member states showed very divided responses
based on their geographical locations and political orientations. The events in Grenada had implications for security institutions and governance in the region. They produced the formation by Barbados and the OECS of the Regional Security System. They also resulted in a much more active and institutionalized US security presence in the CARICOM sub-region.

In 1989, in response to their perceptions of a dramatically changing global environment and unsatisfactory regional advances, the governments established a West Indian Commission to make recommendations on strengthening regional integration. Throughout the 1990s, work was done to restructure the legal provisions and institutions of CARICOM, to establish a single market and to construct a wider diplomatic and trading community in the Greater Caribbean Area. During this period, a shift in their approach to regional security requirements could be detected, namely a greater emphasis on building intra-community relations and the attempt to establish a regional dispute settlement mechanism in the form of the Caribbean Court of Justice, (CCJ)\(^{10}\). The CCJ was intended to have two main functions. For those countries with common law systems, it was thought that it would eventually be their final appellate court. So far, this has been approved and implemented only in Barbados and Guyana. For all the member states, the CCJ is the legal dispute settlement organ for disputes arising in the functioning of the Single Market. Therefore it should be a major instrument in the smooth functioning of community relations. However, it is still greatly under-utilized.
One of the organs created in the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas was COFCOR, the Council on Foreign and Community Relations. This Council of Foreign Ministers has two regular meetings per annum but can be convened for emergency purposes also. COFCOR not only coordinates CARICOM diplomacy vis-à-vis international issues, it also has a mandate to consider intra-Community relations and the domestic or regional issues which may negatively impinge on them. COFCOR has since 2000 routinely discussed developments in Haiti and CARICOM’s policy responses. It has also deliberated on maritime boundary disputes between member states like Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (1999 - 2007), and Suriname and Guyana (2000 - 2007), issued policy statements and engaged in mediation attempts.

The final arbiter remains the Heads of Government Conference which plays an active role in policy-making on community issues and on international affairs. One member country (currently Saint Lucia) holds the portfolio of governance issues and it should be noted that portfolios are periodically re-allocated among the governments. During the political crises which arose in Guyana after the elections in 1998 and in St. Vincent and the Grenadines after the elections of 2000, CARICOM played an intermediary role in collaboration with various civil society organizations within the countries concerned. Thus, since the mid 1990s, CARICOM has become a more active contributor to the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts.

Security governance embarked on a new phase in July 2001 when a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) was set up\textsuperscript{11}. This was fuelled by concerns over
intensifying crime and violence in several CARICOM countries. It was also felt that closer security coordination was necessary for the operations of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The Task Force had a mandate to “examine the major causes of crime and to recommend approaches to deal with inter-related problems, illicit drugs and firearms as well as terrorism” (“CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security” www.caricomimpacs.org accessed 21/03/08). Over the next three years, the Task Force made over one hundred recommendations to CARICOM governments on enforcement measures and socio-economic policies to combat crime and security threats. It also advised on a new regional framework for managing crime and security issues.

The initiative was given added momentum by the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. CARICOM countries in their own right and as members of the OAS committed themselves to supporting the Global War on Terror and to adopting a range of measures promoted by the United States to secure its Third Border\textsuperscript{12}. These included new anti-terrorist legislation and law enforcement measures in some countries, increased air and sea port security and tighter migration policies (Jaramillo Edwards, 2004; Griffith, 2004). US authorities also took the position that governments needed to assert control over lawless zones within their national territory as these could become sites for terrorist-related activities (Cope and Hulse, 2004). Although the US had traditionally based its security cooperation in the Caribbean on a series of bilateral agreements (eg. the Shiprider Agreements 1995 – 1997 or the bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties of the early 1990s), since 1997 there had been greater emphasis on building a multilateral
approach exemplified in the establishment and annual meetings of the Joint Committee for Justice and Security.

The Global War on Terror had contradictory effects on this US-Caribbean multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, the annual convening of the Joint Committee declined and a number of differences emerged between US and CARICOM states’ positions on three important issues, namely relations with Cuba, relations with Haiti and the signing of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. On the other hand, the global and hemispheric focus on security spurred CARICOM on to put in place its own regional institutions. Moreover, US consultations on the Third Border Initiative encompassed CARICOM and the Dominican Republic, which obliged them to maintain closer contact with a regional state which is not part of CARICOM but nonetheless an essential actor in various regional security matters. One last external catalyst was the 2007 staging of Cricket World Cup in the Caribbean. The deadlines for security arrangements associated with this event caused CARICOM’s regional security planning to advance at a much faster pace than would otherwise have been the case (CARICOM IMPACS, 2007).

The government of Trinidad and Tobago holds portfolio responsibility for regional crime and security management. In 2007, Prime Minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago announced that security should now be seen as the “Fourth Pillar” of CARICOM – an obvious reference to the EU model and an example of the demonstration effect of the EU on other regional groupings. The RTFCS had identified the main factors driving regional criminality as the transnational drugs trade, youth unemployment, inequality and
social exclusion. A range of measures to address the socio-economic roots of crime were proposed. While these are assumed to be addressed in countries’ social and economic policy agendas, regional crime and security coordination has focused on institution-building and strengthening and implementing priority areas in a regional crime and security strategy. In 2005, the Council of Ministers responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement was formalized as well as a Security Policy Advisory Committee. An Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), based in Trinidad, was set up in 2006 (“IMPACS Architecture” www.caricomimpacs.org, accessed 21/03/08) and a CARICOM Intelligence Sharing Network by 2007.

The RTFCS was disbanded in 2004. Its successor bodies and agencies continued work on the issues it had identified, including the operation of a regional witness protection system, border security, criminal deportees, mutual assistance in national security emergencies, human resource development and information and intelligence sharing. The four priority areas of regional security cooperation since 2005 have been training for law enforcement and security officials, intelligence sharing, maritime cooperation and enhancing border security. Most of these activities have been supported through the CARICOM-United Kingdom Security Cooperation Plan finalized in 2004 which established the priorities. A significant research component has been the conduct of national studies on the impact of deportees. These are being carried out in Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Policy statements have been made about the need for a sub-regional mutual assistance agreement, a regional arrest warrant agreement for the surrender of fugitives across borders, and a maritime and airspace agreement to improve
the joint use of resources for monitoring marine territory. However, these have not yet materialized (see CARICOM Press release 137/2005 of 27/06/05, www.caricom.org).

Resource shortages are and will probably remain among the most acute challenges facing CARICOM regional security governance. The organization and its members remain heavily dependent on external funding to establish and maintain new security structures. The EU has been involved in providing support for the establishment of the IMPACS agency. Likewise, Britain has made a significant contribution to capacity-building through the CARICOM-United Kingdom Security Cooperation Plan. Nonetheless, a fundamental requirement will be to put institutions on a sustainable financial basis.

Despite the advances in establishing regional security agencies, they appear to fall short in extending their cooperation on transnational crime or other threats to regional states that are not core members of the organization and that do not share the institutional legacy of British colonialism. For example, CARICOM security consultations between 2003 and the present have not often included Haitian or Surinamese officials although they have included law enforcement agencies in several British dependencies. Likewise they have not often involved officials from the Dominican Republic or other non-CARICOM parts of the Caribbean. This means that regional security cooperation remains fragmented which reduces its effectiveness, particularly in areas like confidence building and intelligence sharing.
Regional security cooperation still depends on a push from external developments for significant advances. Cricket World Cup in 2007 was the opportunity for CARICOM countries to introduce a pilot project on governing security activities in a Single Domestic Space. The Trinidad and Tobago administration, with lead responsibility for the security portfolio, is now lobbying member countries to institutionalize such arrangements, arguing that it is necessary for the operation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy and for combating crime. But it remains a sensitive political decision, not yet endorsed by all actors, which would place national security decision-making much further into the realm of regional governance (Communique issued at conclusion of 19th Inter-Sessional Meeting of Conference of Heads of Government, CARICOM Press Release 8/03/08, www.caricom.org). A special regional summit on crime took place early in April 2008 to discuss these issues further.

Some critics point out that regional security initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening law enforcement capabilities without providing equal support for revitalizing outdated and sagging justice systems. Judicial and penal reforms have therefore lagged behind. Moreover, most CARICOM states, caught in an economic climate of declining growth and the pressures of budgetary adjustment and economic restructuring, have scarce resources for addressing social inequality and youth development. Yet these projects are vital to reducing crime and violence, stimulating economic growth and sustainable human development in their societies.

V. Evaluating Regional Security Governance
1. Conflict Prevention

(a) Falling into this category of activity would be the longstanding Belize-Guatemala and the Guyana-Venezuela territorial disputes, as well as the more recent maritime boundary delimitation disputes that flared up between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (1999 – 2007) and Guyana and Suriname (2000 – 2007). CARICOM’s role in the former disputes included the provision of diplomatic support to memberstates in multilateral fora, stressing the need for a peaceful settlement of the disputes and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their member states. On various occasions, nationals from CARICOM states served as mediators acting on behalf of the OAS or the UN or they led fact-finding missions from those organizations. CARICOM showed a preference for working within these multilateral bodies with greater capacity, particularly as only one party to each dispute was a CARICOM member state. In those two cases, although there has been no permanent settlement, the disputes have been managed with minimal threats or outbreaks of armed conflict for several years. In the case of the Belize-Guatemala dispute, as long as referenda in both countries provide a mandate, the dispute should finally be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (Richards, 2008).

In the two latter disputes, the CARICOM role was first to emphasize the need for negotiated or juridical settlements. In the case of Suriname-Guyana, a CARICOM mediator was appointed but had unsuccessful dialogue with the parties.
CARICOM then listed the range of international peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms that were at their disposal and urged them to avail themselves of an appropriate option. In the case of Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago, the parties refrained from using trade sanctions against each other out of deference to the regional organization. Ultimately, both disputes were submitted to compulsory arbitration under Article XV and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and rulings were delivered in 2007 (Donovan, 2007; Griffin, 2007).

(b) Internal political crises

Here one would consider Guyana’s post electoral crisis in December 1977. CARICOM’s response involved several civilian missions and mediation among all the contenders in this crisis of domestic governance. It resulted in the signing of the Herdmanston Accord by political leaders in January 1998. Elements of this included:-

- Three month moratorium on street protests
- An audit of the electoral count and a review of the role of the Electoral Commission to be conducted by CARICOM
- Dialogue to start between the two political parties the PPP/Civic and the PNC.
- Constitutional reform Commission to begin work and to present a report in July 1999.
- New elections to be held within three years.
The CARICOM initiative certainly restored order in the short term and resulted in fresh elections in March 2001 and more widespread acceptance of the results. However, the constitutional reform project petered out. Guyana, for various reasons, has experienced a deepening crisis of law and order since 2002 manifested in a tremendous upsurge of crime and violence and the incapacity of state authorities to contain the crisis.

2. Peace-keeping/peace enforcement

Two examples of this type of security function might be listed as Grenada in 1983 and Haiti in 1994 and 2004. CARICOM’s responses demonstrated two things. First, they showed up CARICOM’s incapacity to undertake such security operations alone, the continued need to play junior partner to external intervention in the form of the United States and/or other actors. This meant also that CARICOM’s policy recommendations in the case of Haiti in 2004, were subordinated to the objectives and priorities of the other actors involved and ultimately rejected\textsuperscript{15}. Second, CARICOM in both cases experienced strong divisions among its own membership concerning appropriate regional responses. This resulted in delayed or divided responses and long term repercussions for regional consensus on security.
3. Peace-building

On the one hand, CARICOM’s performance in this area can be viewed favourably. The regional grouping has contributed to promoting stability and development among its member states. It has undoubtedly contributed to milieu goals, has enhanced the climate of community relations and by working to endorse norms of peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for international institutions, has helped to foster a regional culture of peace.

However, Haiti is the litmus test for these achievements and so far, CARICOM has been very cautious about the extent of its commitment. The organization, partly due to its limited capabilities and also stymied by differing opinions among member states, has not demonstrated much will to engage itself deeply in peace-building operations in Haiti.

V. Conclusion

So, can CARICOM be considered a “security provider”? The answer would be yes, to a limited degree. Due to its limited capabilities and history, it has been much more active in the conflict prevention dimension than in the other spheres. Also, it has shown a preference for working together with other, larger multilateral organizations in the resolution or management of disputes affecting its members. Its tasks have expanded, particularly since 2001, with the focus on antiterrorism and on combating organized crime in member states. It is not quite clear how these latter activities
which relate to internal security should be categorized since they do not fit easily into the conventional categories of conflict prevention, peace keeping/enforcement or peace building. Nonetheless, they are vital for security governance in the region.

There remain four major challenges. The first concerns the resource shortages for addressing security challenges. Second, if regional security governance is to become more effective there is the need for more extensive collaboration with other regional actors who are not part of the grouping or not among its core membership. Third, there is the ongoing challenge of security cooperation with major powers which involves a perpetual balancing of interests and priorities. Finally, in the present regional threat scenario, where the emphasis is so heavily on transnational crime and localized violence, on juvenile delinquency, unemployment and social exclusion, there is the need for much closer collaboration between state and civil society actors in order to formulate and implement effective human security responses.
1. This has been expressed most recently in the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, which involves extensive political and economic cooperation, financial and technical assistance to sixteen neighbouring countries to the East and South of the EU. The ENP is based on the following principles, “It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies, or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe……Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (European Security Strategy, December 2003, cited in eufocus January 2008).

2. Lavenex (2005) details the slow development of cooperation not only in foreign and security policy but in sensitive areas of domestic security and sovereignty encompassed in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht. She refers to the latter as transgovernmental (i.e. rather than intergovernmental cooperation). Direct EU institutional involvement grew after the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 with its objective of creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the establishment of EUROPOL in 1999. It accelerated with the prospect of Eastern enlargement. The weaker capabilities and disparate
justice and security institutions of many of the acceding member states necessitated stronger coordination by the European Union. While the agenda for national security cooperation has expanded considerably, EU states have preferred to keep it mainly transgovernmental and less communitarised than other areas of EU integration.

3. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.

4. For example, the security perceptions of Belize and Guyana are heavily influenced by their locations in Central and South America, by the historical territorial disputes between themselves and neighbouring states, by the porosity of their borders and their great vulnerability to instability in the surrounding environment. Threat perceptions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic revolve around their shared land border, among other things. Shared marine space and resources led to the maritime delimitation, resource based disputes of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, also Guyana and Suriname. Most Caribbean countries face perennial threats of natural disasters involving climate change and the environment.

5. This is well illustrated by Griffith (2004), Caribbean Security in an Age of Terror, pp. 514 – 515, in which he presents data on multilateral security engagement
zones in the Caribbean and agencies and networks in these multilateral security engagement zones.


8. There has been considerable controversy in policy discussions about the impact of deportations from North America and Europe on local crime statistics. While policy-makers have periodically linked the deportees to rising crime in their societies, a study by Oliver Headley in 2004 reached less categorical conclusions and focused more on the need to provide support and re-integrative facilities for such deportees. For the former position, see Ann Marie Barnes (2007), Congressional Hearing: Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere “Deportees in Latin America and the Caribbean” July 24 2007, www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2007_h/070744-barnes.htm, also A. Barnes, “Flawed Critique, Flawed Analysis – Deportee Study followed Tried and Tested Methodology”, Jamaica Gleaner, 24/12/2006. For reports on the latter perspective, see “Deportees have little impact on crime, study says”, Jamaica Star Online, 29/09.2004, www.jamaica-star.com/the star/20040928/news3.html
9. For example, US aid to the Caribbean region for the military and the police between 2004 and 2009 concentrates mainly on counter-narcotics activities, related training and equipment. The emphasis has been primarily on interdiction and far less on demand reduction. On the other hand, the European Union has been the leading funder of demand reduction activities, seeking to build capacity both in demand reduction and supply reduction activities (see “EU Support and Strategy for the Caribbean” address delivered 12/09/07 at CARICOM Meeting of National Observatories on Drugs, www.cicad.oas.org. In addressing the current explosion of organized crime activities, Britain has provided the most consistent support for building local and regional capacity.

10. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was inaugurated in 2004 and is based in Trinidad.

11. The Regional Task Force on Crime and Security was composed of representatives from the national security authorities, regional bodies like the Regional Security System, the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (which includes representatives from the police jurisdictions of the French, Dutch, British and US dependencies), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, a regional association of Customs officials and some regional criminologists. Interview with RTF member, Kingston, October 2005.


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